Introduction 1
Utility independence is widely used in decision analysis (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976 usually based on the normatively convincing, but descriptively problematic, expected 7 utility theory for choices between risky prospects (probability distributions over 8 outcomes). Then the condition usually implies that multiattribute utility is additive, 9 multiplicative, or multilinear. 10 Utility independence concerns situations where the levels of some attributes are 11 fixed deterministically. The condition then requires that preferences between 12
prospects over the remaining attributes should be independent of the fixed 13 deterministic levels. This requirement has often been tested directly (Miyamoto & A second problem with traditional analyses of utility independence is that they 24 have been based on expected utility maximization. There is, however, much evidence 25 that expected utility is violated empirically (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961 ; Kahneman 26 1 
10
These are sequences of attribute levels that are equally spaced in utility units, 11 endogenously derived from preferences without using the utility function. In 12 marketing, standard sequences are used in the saw-tooth method (Fishburn, 1967 ; 13 Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000) . Krantz et al. (1971) 
Utility independence 5
The second attribute T is utility independent if 6
for all Q,Q and for all T 1 ,T 2 ,T 3 ,T 4 . That is, preferences do not depend on the 10 particular deterministic level at which Q is fixed. As throughout, it is implicitly 11 assumed that all prospects are contained in X 2  . Preferential independence is utility 12 independence restricted to constant prospects: 13
In economic consumer theory, preferential independence is known as separability of 17 T, and in conjoint measurement (Krantz et al., 1971 ) it is part of joint independence. 18 Preferential independence implies that we can define preferences over the second 19 attribute T independently from the first attribute. It is naturally satisfied if T is an 20 interval and monotonicity holds. A convenient implication of preferential 21 independence is that changing Q in Eq. 3.1 does not affect rank-ordering. That is, the 22 upper two prospects in Eq. 3.1 are contained in X only necessary, but also sufficient for U being additive or multiplicative (Miyamoto 4 and Wakker, 1996, Theorem 3). Then, in Eq. 3.3 below, f or g has to be constant. 5
The following theorem extends a well known result from classical setups to our 6 domain X 
Standard sequence invariance 14
A convenient feature of the standard sequence technique introduced next is that it 15 is directly related to the empirical measurement of utility. T 0 , …, T n is a (Q-)standard 16 sequence if there exist Q*, T g , and T G such that, for i = 0,…, n1, 17 between conjoint measurement and multiattribute utility because the necessary and 22 sufficient form in Eq. 3.3 is identical to that in Eq. 4.2: Under preferential 23 independence and richness, standard sequence invariance on T is equivalent to utility 1 independence of T! That is, we can test utility independence by testing standard 2 sequence invariance. We can now for instance reduce the cancellation heuristic by 3 taking different Q and Q* in Eq. 4.1. This way, we can avoid biases that have 4 distorted traditional tests of utility independence. We will state the relations between 5 utility independence and standard sequence invariance formally in the following 6 section. 7
We next provide an axiomatization of multiplicative utility, useful for QALY 8 measurement in health ( §6). We call T 0 T a null element if (R,T 0 ) ~ (R´,T 0 ) for all R 9 and R´. above result is that Q then also is utility independent on the subdomain where V is 20 positive (which excludes the null element). 21 We have defined standard sequences for outcomes under not-E, that is, outcomes 22 ranked worst and less preferred than the gauge outcomes. Standard sequences can 23 equally well be defined for outcomes under E, when they are ranked best and are 1 preferred to the gauge outcomes, using the following indifferences: 2
For representation theorems, the topic of this paper, it is desirable to use weak 4 preference conditions in order to obtain the logically strongest theorems. For 5 empirical investigations it can be interesting to consider more restrictive preference 6 conditions, to obtain more possibilities to falsify a theory or to measure its concepts. 7
Hence, for empirical purposes it may be interesting to also consider standard 8 sequences defined in Eq. 4.4 and to investigate consistency properties between such 9 larger classes of standard sequences. It easily follows that we should also have 10 invariance here under Eq. 4.2. 
Generalizations and main result 20
We first extend our results to n-attribute utility. Assume that X is X 1  ...  X n for 21 a natural number n  2, with generic element (x 1 , …, x n ). Let I  {1,…,n} and write T 22 =  iI X i and Q =  iI X i . We can write X = Q  T. Utility independence of I is 23 defined as utility independence of T (Eq. 3.1). That is, if the attribute levels outside 24 of I are kept fixed at deterministic levels, then the preferences generated over 1 prospects over T are independent of the deterministic levels chosen. We can define 2 standard sequences on  iI X i exactly as in Eq. 4.1, where now T g , T i+1 , T G , T i 3  jI X j , and Q*, Q   iI X i . Standard sequence invariance on  iI X i requires 4 consistency between standard sequences in  iI X i for all Q and Q in  iI X i . The 5 following theorem immediately follows from Theorems 3.1 and 4.2. , with X = X 1  ...  X n , and I  {1,…,n}. 8
Let T =  iI X i and Q =  iI X i . Preferences are represented by Eq. 2.1 (with T = 9 (x i ) iI and Q = (x i ) iI ). The image of (x i ) iI # U((x j ) jI ,(x i ) iI ) is an interval for each 10 (x j ) jI . Then I is utility independent if and only if  iI X i is preferentially independent 11 and standard sequence invariance on  iI X i holds.  12
13
We next consider decision theories defined on general domains of prospects, 14 leading to our main result. Now prospects can be probability distributions over 15 outcomes with more than one probability involved, or mappings from multi-element 16 state spaces to outcomes, and prospects need not all have the same rank-ordering. 17
The definition of utility independence needs no adaptation: On all subproduct 18 domains, preference is independent of the deterministic level at which outside 19 attributes are kept fixed. We define standard sequence invariance by defining 20 standard sequences on all subsets isomorphic to X For brevity, we do not elaborate on this point. 2 3 OBSERVATION 5.2. Let X = X 1  ...  X n be a set of outcomes, and let  be a 4 preference relation on a set of prospects. Prospects can be probability distributions 5 over X (risk), or functions from a state space S to X (uncertainty). The set of 6 prospects is rich enough to contain a set of the form X
are not affected if a constant is added to utility or if utility is multiplied by a positive 10 constant. 5 If, for a set I  {1,…,n}, the utility image of  iI X i is an interval whenever 11 the attributes outside of I are kept fixed, then utility independence of I is equivalent to 12 preferential independence and standard sequence invariance on  iI X i .  13 14
An application to health 15
This section applies the above results to medical decision making. Outcomes 16 (Q,T) are chronic health states, with Q describing the constant health state and T the 17 life duration spent in this health state, followed by death. Unlike in economics or 18 psychology, statistical probabilities of risks are often available in the health domain. 19 We will assume that prospects are probability distributions over chronic health states. 20 5 The requirements in our observation hold for most theories that are popular today. These include expected utility for risk (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and for uncertainty (Savage, 1954) , rank-dependent utility for risk (Quiggin, 1982) and for uncertainty (Gilboa, 1987; Schmeidler, 1989 
We can then test whether the two standard sequences agree, as required by standard 9 sequence invariance and the QALY model. A useful spinoff of these measurements is 10 that they directly measure the utility functions (i.e., discounting) for life duration 11 under Q and Q´ (Wakker & Deneffe, 1996) . If these are different under Q than under 12
Q´ then the QALY model is violated. 
Because T 2 and T 1 have the same V difference as T 1 and T 0 , Eq. A.3 also holds for i = 8
1. That is, T 0 , T 1 , T 2 is a Q-standard sequence. 9
Because T 1  T 1 *, we can find T 2 *  T 2 such that T 0 , T 1 , T 2 * are equally spaced in 10 V* units. domains, it can readily be seen that such versions are easy to obtain. Replacing the 7 deterministic level of some attributes amounts to an interval rescaling of utility, which 8 does not alter equal spacedness of utility on, for instance, comonotonic subsets under 9 rank-dependent utility.  
